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realistic approach of the common law, but also avoids rigidity and




Clarkson Co. Ltd. v. Canadian Bank of Commerce et al. (1966), 57
D.L.R. (2d) 193.
TRUST FUND PROVISION OF THE MECHANICS' LIEN ACT-RIGHT OF CON-
TRACTOR TO RETAIN TRUST MONEY FOR OWN USE-DUALITY OF THE
CONTRACTOR'S ROLE AS TRUSTEE AND BENEFICIARY.
By the terms of Section 3(1) of the Mechanics' Lien Act,' a
contractor becomes trustee of all sums received on account of the
contract price and is directed not to appropriate or convert any part
thereof to its own use or to any use not authorized by the trust until
the terms of the trust are executed.2 This section has been held to
be almost absolute in its operation. The principle underlying the
various cases interpreting the section is that the trust attaches, and
remains firmly attached, to all sums paid on account of the contract
price whether received by an assignee of book debts from an owner
with notice of the assignment,3 or paid into court by the owner,4 or
received by the contractor and applied to its overdraft by the bank
upon deposit.5 It has most often frustrated the expectations of those
58 MODEL PENAL CODE, § 2.09, Proposed Official Draft, 1962, (AmEaiCAN
LAW INsTITUTE):
(i) It is an affirmative defense that the actor engaged in the conduct
charged to constitute an offence because he was coerced to do so by
the use of, or a threat to use, unlawful force against his person or
the person of another, which a person of reasonable firmness in his
situation would have been unable to resist.
Colin C. Coolican, B.A. (McGill University), is a member of the 1967
graduating class at Osgoode Hall Law School.
I R.S.O. 1960, c. 233.
2 Section 3(1)-All sums received by a builder or contractor or a sub-
contractor on account of the contract price are and constitute a trust fund
in the hands of the builder or contractor, or of the subcontractor, as the case
may be, for the benefit of the proprietor, builder or contractor, subcontrac-
tors, Workmen's Compensation Board, workmen and persons who have sup-
plied material on account of the contract, and the builder or contractor or
the sibcontractor, as the case may be, is the trustee of all such sums so
received by him, and until all workmen and all persons who have supplied
material on the contract and all subcontractors are paid for work done or
material supplied on the contract and the Workmen's Compensation Board
is paid any assessment with respect thereto, may not appropriate or convert
any part thereof to his own use or to any use not authorized by the trust.
3 Minneapolis-Honeywell Ltd. v. Empire Brass Mfg. Co. Ltd., [19553 3
D.L.R. 561, [19553 S.C.R. 694; Bank of MontreaZ v. Townslh4p of Sydney, [19553
O.W.N. 581.
4 Re Watson and Murchison, (1963) 40 D.L.R. (2d) 1047.
5 FontiZill Lumber Ltd. v. Bank of Montreal, 19 D.L.R. 618, [19593 O.R.
451, 38 C.B.R. 68.
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who undertake to extend credit to building contractors and sub-
contractors. Beneficiaries of the trust recover from the assignee of
book debts on the ground that assignments of trust money remain
subject to the equities. The bank that applies deposited trust funds
to the contractor's overdraft is held liable to the beneficiaries if it
is found that the contractor has committed a breach of trust and that
the bank has knowingly participated therein.6
The type of case in which the bank will be held to account to
the beneficiaries in the latter situation is illustrated by the facts in
the case of Clarkson Co. Ltd. v. Canadian Bank of Commerce.7 Gels
General Contractors Ltd. had contracted to build a school for the
Toronto Board of Education. In December, 1959, the defendant bank,
acting through the manager of a branch where Gels did all its bank-
ing, agreed to extend $45,000 credit to the general contractor. Until
October 27, 1960, it was the practice for Gels to draw cheques in
favour of unpaid sub-contractors, workers and suppliers of material
and, if in so doing it incurred an overdraft, to sign notes to put the
account back into credit. Subsequent payments into Gels' account,
as the result of draws received on account of the contract price were
appropriated by the bank to discharge these notes and thus restore
Gels' credit position. This arrangement subsisted until the bank, with
knowledge that Gels was being pressed for payment by the sub-
contractors and that two mechanics' liens had been filed, decided to
terminate the agreement. Thus, when Gels, who had no notice of the
bank's intention, deposited a cheque for $31,999.01 received on account
of the contract price on October 27, the bank appropriated it to the
overdraft and subsequently declined to honour cheques drawn by Gels
in favour of unpaid sub-contractors. The learned trial judge, Gale J.,
as he then was, found that the defendant bank knew that the cheque
had been received by Gels on account of the contract price and that
there were sub-contractors who had not been paid for work done and
materials supplied in performance of that contract. The question of
the degree of knowledge required to establish participation in a breach
of trust shall not be dealt with here. On these facts, the issue was
decided for the plaintiff at trial8 and was not raised again on either
appeal.9
6 The general exception to the rule is that where sums impressed with
the trust are deposited in the ordinary course of business, the bank takes free
of the trust. Here, the exculpatory factor is the bank's absence of knowledge
of the existence of the trust. See: Standard Electric Co. v. Royal Bank of
Canada, 24 D.L.R. (2d) 460, [1960] O.W.N. 367, 1 C.B.R. (N.S.) and John M.
Troup Ltd. et al. v. Royal Bank of Canada, 34 D.L.R. (2d) 556, [1962] S.C.R.
487, 3 C.B.R. (N.S.).
7 (1966) 57 D.L.R. (2d) 193. (Supreme Court of Canada). Appeal by the
plaintiff from the judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal, (1965) 47 D.L.R.
(2d) 289, sub nom. John Ritchie Ltd. v. Canadian Bank of Commerce, allow-
ing an appeal from the High Court of Ontario, (1963) 38 D.L.R. (2d) 546.
8 (1963) 38 D.L.R. (2d) 546, at pp. 561-571.
9 For a thorough discussion of the subject of knowledge see Mik, J. W.,
The Trust Fund Provision of the Mechanics' Lien Act, Osgoode Hall Law
Journal, Vol. 4, No. 1, April, 1966, p. 77 and particularly at p. 86.
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The chief issue at all levels, trial and appellate, was whether or
not Gels had been guilty of a breach of trust. Counsel for the defend-
ant bank structured an argument which, if it had succeeded, would
have served to exculpate the bank by setting it at arm's length from
the operation of the trust. The facts material to his contention are
to be found in the course of dealings between Gels and the sub-
contractors on the one hand, and between Gels and its suppliers and
workers on the other. The latter were paid by Gels as materials were
invoiced or as wages fell due without waiting for a progress certifi-
cate from the architects. Payment of the sub-contractors entailed
their billing Gels who in turn submitted a request for an interim
payment to the Board of Education. These requisitions, which were
prepared approximately once a month, included amounts claimed by
Gels for work done and material supplied through its employees and
suppliers. If the requisition was approved by the architects, Gels
received a cheque for the sum requested, less the statutory holdback
of 15%. This procedure involved a time lag of one month. The pay-
ment of October 27th, 1960, was made pursuant to a requisition dated
September 30, 1960. In the meantime, further sums had fallen due
to Gels and the sub-contractors. The trial judge found that Gels' out-
of-pocket expenses during the month prior to October 27th exceeded
the $31,999.01 received on that date.
On the strength of these facts, counsel for the defendant sub-
mitted "that a trust did not come into existence for the reason that,
as soon as the sum of $31,999.01 was received by Gels from the owner,
it was contemporaneously or instantly freed from any trust in favour
of the other beneficiaries.. "10 His reasons were twofold. First, since
Section 3 (1) contemplates that the contract price shall be the limit of
the trust, to hold that the contractor may not reimburse itself out of
sums received on account of the contract price to the extent of its
expenses prior to the draw would serve to give the beneficiaries
security not only in the contract price, but also in an amount beyond
that price equal to that sum paid to them by the contractor. Secondly,
s-s. (3), particularly in view of its opening words, "notwithstanding
the other provisions of this section", operates as an exception to
the rule in s-s. (1).
3.-(3) Notwithstanding the other provisions of this section, where a
builder, contractor or sub-contractor has paid in whole or in part for any
materials supplied on account of the contract, or any workman or sub-
contractor who has performed any work or services or placed or furnished
any material in respect of such contract, the retention by such builder,
contractor or sub-contractor of any amount so paid by him shall not be
deemed an appropriation or conversion thereof to his own use or to any
use not authorized by the trust.
Counsel argued that the effect of this subsection is to make the con-
tractor a beneficiary of the trust to the extent of money paid out on
the job. Accordingly, in this case Gels took the entire sum of $33,999.01
beneficially.
10 38 D.L.R. (2d) 546 at p. 556.
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This attempt to establish the bank's immunity to the claims of the
unpaid sub-contractors by severing the sum deposited by Gels from the
statutory trust ultimately failed on two grounds. It was held that the
facts of this case do not come within the exception. At trial, Gale,
3. stated:
In other words, to make s-s(3) effective, it would have to be shown that
the total of all moneys paid out by Gels on the contract prior to October
27th was at least $31,999.01 greater than the total of draws received by
it prior to that date, and the fact that Gels expended more in October
than it received in that month would not automatically give it the right
to keep the whole of the $31,999.01.11
The majority of the bench in the Supreme Court of Canada concurred
with this view.'2
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Canada did not agree with
respondent's interpretation of the nature of the exception. The learned
Cartwright, J., speaking for the majority, held that:
Assuming, for the purposes of this branch of the matter, that in fact
when Gels deposited the cheque for $31,999.01 the total of all payments
made by it out of its own funds in fulfillment of the contract exceeded
by that amount the total of all payments received by it on account of the
contract price, the result would not be that the $31,999.01 was not subject
to the statutory trust created by s. 3; it would be, as pointed out by
Roach, J.A., that Gels was trustee of the fund and also one of the bene-
ficiaries of the trust.13
In other words, s-s.(3) does not exclude the operation of the rule
expressed in the opening words of s-s.(1): "All sums received by a
... contractor... on account of the contract price are and constitute
a trust fund in the hands of the contractor.. ." Although it is possible
to argue against this position, it is clear that the Court, while willing
to recognize the equity of the contractor in sums so received, has
manifested an intention to exercise some supervision over those sums
in order to protect the interest of the other unpaid beneficiaries. This
is entirely consistent with the purpose of Section 3 of the Act.
The implications of this, particularly for the contractor's credi-
tors, are described by Cartwright, 3.:
When Gels received the $31,999.01 it did so as trustee but had a discre-
tionary power to pay it to one or more of the beneficiaries to the exclu-
sion of others. It had therefore, in the assumed situation, a discretion to
retain it all for itself. Gels acted throughout by its general manager,
Livingstone, and it appears to me that the only reasonable inference to
be drawn from the relevant evidence is that Livingstone decided not to
retain the money for Gels but to pay it out to the plaintiff and the others
on whose behalf the plaintiff sues. 14
Normally, a trustee must distribute trust moneys pro rata when there
is not sufficient to realize the claims of all the beneficiaries. If this
principle had been applicable in this case, it may have been arguable
that Gels was entitled to take a share of the $31,999.01, in proportion
11 38 D.L.R. (2d) at p. 561.
12 57 D.L.R. (2d) at p. 199. The Court also "reached the conclusion that
in the circumstances of this case the onus lay upon the respondents to show
that Gels was entitled as beneficiary to all or part of the $31,999.01, and that
it has not discharged that onus". At p. 200, Judson, J. dissenting, at p. 204.
13 57 D.L.R. (2d) at pp. 201-202.
14 57 D.L.R. (2d) at p. 202.
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to the amount claimed in the requisition of September 30th, in the
capacity of beneficiary. However, it has been held that since s-s. (1)
does not stipulate the manner in which the corpus of the trust is to be
distributed, the contractor has "a discretionary power, and his
obligation is satisfied when the trust moneys are paid out to persons
entitled, whatever the division."u5 It is the exercise of this discretion
that the Court wishes to supervise.
Thus, it may be stated that if the contractor has a beneficial
interest, the interest does not vest automatically. The contractor
takes in its capacity as trustee and then must constitute itself a
beneficiary by performing some act in relation to the trust fund that
the courts will classify as a retention for its own use. In determining
whether or not the contractor has decided to exercise its discretion in
its own favour the courts have looked to the intention of the con-
tractor. In this case, the trial judge made the following statement:
Livingstone probably thought that the cheque would be treated in the
way in which its predecessors had been treated and that its proceeds
would be employed to reduce the overdraft and thus provide the basis
for the extension of further credit with which to pay the sub-contractors.
But it is also certain that, at least, he knew beyond any doubt that there
was an overdraft and that the cheque would be used by the bank to
reduce that overdraft. 16
Hence, it would appear that it was the contractor's actual inten-
tion to retain the $31,999.01 for his own use, that is, to secure credit
on the basis of which the sub-contractors would be paid in due course,
particularly in light of the fact that Gels did not know that the credit
agreement was about to be terminated by the bank. However, Cart-
wright, J. seems to have interpreted the contractor's intention
differently:
Livingstone's intention... was to follow an established practice of deposit-
ing the trust moneys in Gels' only bank account and paying it out forth-
with to its sub-contractors who were beneficiaries of the trust: that this
was his intention was well known to the branch manager of the bank.17
This view can be explained only if it is assumed that Cartwright,
J. preferred to ignore the form of the manner in which Gels expected
the sub-contractors to be paid. That is, whether they are to be paid
out of the same funds as deposited by the contractor or out of the
funds made available to the contractor by virtue of its credit position
being restored by the appropriation of funds so deposited to the over-
draft is immaterial. The fact that the contractor issues cheques in
favour of the unpaid beneficiaries is conclusive evidence of its intention
not to retain the moneys for its own use.
One can foresee that it will be difficult for the courts to determine
whether a contractor has exercised its discretion in its own favour
or in favour of the other beneficiaries and hence, when it is competent
for a bank to appropriate funds paid into an overdrawn account. In
this case, it was held that:
15 Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. Ltd. v. Empire Brass Mfg. Co.
supra, footnote 3, per Rand, J. at p. 563 D.L.R.
16 38 D.L.R. (2d) at p. 570.
17 57 D.L.R. (2d) at p. 203.
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It is elementary that a trustee cannot delegate the exercise of a discretion
committed to him by the instrument creating the trust and a fortiori he
cannot be compelled by a creditor who is a stranger to the trust to exer-
cise his discretion in a particular manner which will benefit that stranger
to the detriment of the beneficiaries.18
Would that principle be applicable in this situation? X deposits $40,000,
to which it is beneficially entitled, into its account which is overdrawn
to the extent of $20,000. X immediately issues cheques totalling
$20,000 to unpaid beneficiaries and these cheques are honoured by
the bank. Two weeks later, the bank appropriates the $20,000 remain-
ing in X's account to the overdraft. X, without notice of the appropria-
tion, issues cheques amounting to $20,000 and the bank subsequently
dishonours them. At the material time, the bank knows that there
are unpaid beneficiaries. Would the lapse of two weeks indicate
that X had decided to retain the $20,000 for its own use, or does
that sum remain subject to the trust? There are endless variations
on this simple theme, each a potential source of litigation. It is sub-
mitted that the only effective way for the banks to protect them-
selves is to give actual notice of an intent to terminate a credit
agreement, or to appropriate sums to which the contractor is bene-
ficially entitled, before they are deposited. This will compel the con-
tractor to exercise its discretion in a manner that the courts will
recognize as decisive proof of intention.
It is possible that the exception recognized and established by
this case will restore the importance of the assignment of book debts
as a security in the field of construction financing. For example, a
contractor makes an assignment for valuable consideration of all
sums received on account of the contract price to which it may become
beneficially entitled. One can anticipate a number of issues that may
arise. Does the word "retention" in s-s. (3) include a retention by an
assignee? Is it competent for a trustee to make such an assignment?
Are the courts prepared to hold that the contractor may exercise its
discretion prior to the receipt of sums on account of the contract
price? While it is not within the scope of this article to answer these
questions, it is submitted that the rule that a contractor as trustee
cannot bestow by assignment a better title than that which it has shall
no longer be conclusive in these cases.
Finally, the case of the banker who is fortunate enough to have
no knowledge of the trust, or of a contractor's breach of trust, will
not be influenced by the principle laid down in this case regarding a
stranger to the trust compelling an exercise of the trustee's discretion.
The absence of such knowledge in the appropriate circumstances has
been held to release the money from the trust and to vest legal title
in the bank.19
DONALD D. WITE.:-
18 57 D.L.R. (2d) at p. 202.
19 Supra, footnote 6.
* Donald D. White, B.A. (University of Toronto) is a second year student
at Osgoode Hall Law School.
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